ognized a transnational freedom of speech which it characterized as the receiving and imparting of information and ideas "regardless of frontiers."
5 Principle VII also declared that the participating states "[would] also fulfill their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights." '6 More specifically, principle VII reaffirmed the obligation of the participating states to "respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." '7 It also confirmed "the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field," 8 and expressly recognized "the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 9 The Helsinki
Final Act contains, as well, an important set of agreements concerning transnational "human contacts" 10 and "the freer and wider dissemination of information." 1 1 These are found within a section of the Act entitled "Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields," more commonly referred to as "Basket III." Despite the fact that the Helsinki Final Act stands as an important recognition or reaffirmation of several aspects of human rights law, doubt has been raised concerning its proper use as an international instrument during present and future is now widely recognized that the Universal Declaration provides, at a minimum, the legally relevant content of the human rights guaranteed to all by the UN Charter. See supra note 3.
5. See supra note 3. BULL. 578 (1977) . Although it has not yet been ratified by the United States, the United States is obligated to take no action that will adversely affect the major purposes of the Covenant: the protection and enjoyment of fundamental human rights. For evidence of such an obligation upon the signing of a treaty, see, e.g., 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, at 291, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39 (1969) .
7. As explained above, this obligation and the correlative recognition of the rights of all individuals to a transnational freedom of opinion and expression is widely documented. See supra note 3. Moreover, unlike principle VII of the Final Act, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also expressly prohibits any distinction on the basis of "colour, . . . political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" as such. Universal Declaration, supra note 3, art. 2.
8. Although the language "know and act upon his rights" is new, it seems merely to follow from an implementation of the documented recognitions and guarantees found, for example, in articles 2 ("[e] veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms"), 6 ("right to recognition everywhere as a person"), 7 ("[a~ll are equal before the law and are entitled . . .to equal protection of the law"), and 8 ("right to an effective remedy") of the Universal Declaration. Interrelated, of course, are articles 18 (right to freedom of thought, including the right "alone or in community with others" to "manifest" a "belief in teaching, practice . . . and observance"), and 26 (the right to education, including an "education" directed toward "the strengthening of respect for human rights"). Professor Cassese recognizes that the newer Helsinki language is related to rights to "enjoy" human rights and to have "effective domestic remedies" which also relate to corresponding duties of states. See Cassese, supra note 3, at 286. On the right to an effective remedy, see also 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6, art. 2, 1, 3. 9. As explained more fully below, this recognition is relevant to the fact that deprivations of fundamental human rights have become matters of international concern and thus are not matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a violator state within the meaning of article 2(7) of the UN Charter.
See zfta text accompanying notes 103-04. 10. DROIT INTERNATIONAL 130, 141 (1977) It is to be expected that the signatory States would not risk political and moral responsibility (which for states as well as individuals can sometimes be more painful than legal sanctions) by not complying with the agreed obligations. This. . . is not only experienced in the form of criticism. . . . Constant reminders by the public abroad and at home threaten a nation's prestige, which is in itself an element of power to be neglected only at one's own peril. The main point, which is shared by the last two writers, is profound. It not only raises questions concerning a functional difference between legal obligations and moral-political obligations, but also points toward the kind of inquiry one might make in order to address more realistically the problems and potential approaches to solution involved in any effort to implement an international agreement.
Other views have been expressed; some even suggest that the act represents actual legal obligations. For example, a Czechoslovak writer has stated that the Final Act, like the 1966 Covenants, sets forth "binding standards that ought to be followed, ' 24 even though "[t]he official position of most East European countries is that the Helsinki Accord confers no rights directly on the individual." 2 5 He gives much of his argument away, however, when he asks: "Why not . . . take a bolder step by giving the Final Act tacit or implicit recognition as a legally binding obligation?" 2 6 Implicitly, the writer acknowledges that such a recognition does not now generally exist.
Professor Christopher Osakwe points out that certain Soviet authors "contend, most unequivocally, that the Helsinki Accord is a binding document" and a "source of international law." '2 7 Some even declared that the Final Act "has a special political and legal significance, . . . contains independent normative rules Vest, ABA Workshop, supra note 15, at 33; see also Nimetz, ABA Workshop, supra note 15, at 96 ("reflects basic Western values . . . our own values").
22. Schachter, supra note 13, at 304. For a related view that "moral and political obligations are not necessarily illusory," see Jonathan & Jacqu&, supra 103, 104-05, 112-18 (1977) .
23. Dimitrijevik,supra note 3, at 272-73. On this point, see also Jonathan &Jacqu6, supra note 12, at 53, adding: "For the defaulting state, the failure to fulfill moral and political obligations would entail a loss of prestige and credibility . . . "; Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 300 (costs and benefits). The Staff Director and General Counsel to the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe has also stated: "Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership have attached their own personal political prestige to the Final Act. It is very difficult for the Soviets to renounce the Helsinki Final Act or to ignore it." Oliver, supra note 15, at 35. On Brezhnev's personal stake, see also The Soviet authors quoted above were referring to the legal nature of the Final Act in its totality. 30 They were necessarily, therefore, referring to the human rights provisions of the act as well. Moreover, the acknowledged Soviet tendency "to distinguish between the legally binding nature of the Declaration of Principles and the recommendatory or programmatic character of other provisions," such as the Basket III provisions, 3 ' does not preclude the inference that the Soviets recognize that the Helsinki Act contains legal obligations pertaining to human rights. This is especially true because principle VII of the Declaration on Principles is expressly directed toward recognition and implementation of the human rights of all persons. 32 Nevertheless, it would seem partly unrealistic to assume that such a recognition, even if widely shared among Soviet elites, would allow one comfortably to conclude that the Soviets feel legally bound to implement the normative phrasescontained in principle VII. Not only is the Soviet view regarding implementation of human rights quite different, at least overtly, from that of much of the international community, 33 but there is also little evidence to suggest that the existing official governmental view is different from actual Soviet practice either prior or subsequent to the formal signing of a document at Helsinki. That practice, in fact, has been thwarting of the human rights mentioned in the Final Act. 28. Osakwe, supra note 27, at 322 (quoting G. IGNATENKO 71-72 (1978) This realization might be painful for those keenly interested in alleviating the human suffering and injustice that is necessarily involved in the deprivation of fundamental human rights. Nevertheless, not every conference document that mentions human rights is actually authoritative in the community. Nor is every such document reflective of general patterns of legal expectation and behavior or of ongoing social patterns that form the basis of law in any particular or more general social process. 35 Certainly a "nonbinding" document may reflect one or more legal norms that are recognized in customary law, some authoritative legal instrument, or both. 36 The Final Act contains at least some presently recognized legal norms. Moreover, a "nonbinding" document can contribute through time to the shaping of attitudes and behavior to such an extent that it becomes accepted either as a legally relevant aid for the interpretation of other international '46 and that whether or not it "will lead to the creation of customary international law is an open question.
'47 Thus, the needed base of generally shared legal expectation concerning the act as such is presently lacking.
What Kiss and Dominick seem to substitute for the missing patterns of expectation, or opiniojuris, is the admitted fact that the Final Act has produced "legal effects." '48 They argue that these effects "place it within the scope of international law." 49 The circle of reasoning does not close, however. It simply does not follow that because a document produces "legal effects" (for example, a change in a domestic statute), it is itself a legal document, a legally binding document, "a special category of international legal instruments," 50 or even a document that has "a specific legal nature." 51 Such a status is for the future.
Similarly, Professor William Bishop has recognized that the Final Act "is not legally binding," and adds, "[n]onetheless, in some respects it has been talked about and treated almost as if it were a legal commitment by the states which are parties.
' 5 2 If such talk and treatment continue, and someday help to shape pat- terns of more widespread and intensely held legal expectation, a document not now legally binding as such may become a "legal instrument. '' 5 3 Knowing this, some writers may even have intentionally utilized words such as "duty, ' 5 4 "rules, ' 5 5 or "violations" 56 (without the qualifiers "moral" or "political") in an attempt to further such an outcome.
It is also noteworthy that some private Helsinki monitoring groups may actually believe that the Final Act is a legal instrument and may be seeking to promote such an expectation. On the other hand, they may simply share the more common opinion that the Final Act is an important political document that recognizes, in significant ways, that a human rights law exists and must be effectively guaranteed and implemented according to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 57 In any event, the private monitoring groups themselves are an important outcome and part of the ongoing Helsinki process. As explained below, they also contribute significantly to the many legal effects which flow from such a process.
III LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS

A. Private Monitoring Groups
Several writers have commented on the fact that the Helsinki Final Act was one of the main catalysts for the creation of private human rights monitoring groups. 58 The creation of these private groups and their role as defenders of human rights has been termed "a development which few at Helsinki in 1975 could have predicted.
'59 Yet it is this development which may well have placed the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act in recorded history. For example, Valery Chalidze states that such a historic place has been reserved for these provisions "by virtue of not so much their content as the strong public response they have elicited." 6 53. See, e.g., supra notes 37, 39. 54. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 2, at 286; see also Goldberg, supra note 33, at 320 ("obligations"). 55. See, e.g.. Pechota, supra note 17, at 492; see also id. at 468 ("binding standards"). 56. See, e.g. , Goldberg, supra note 33, at 320; see also Pechota, supra note 17, at 472 ("infringements of the obligations assumed").
57. On the more recently accepted nature of human rights law, nation-state obligations, and individual rights (including the right to an effective remedy identifiable in article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as supplemented by articles 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the Declaration), see generally supra notes 2-8 and the symposium on litigating human rights, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. Although many of the East European members of such groups have suffered greatly as a result of governmental crackdowns, 6 t their suffering has attracted greater attention to human rights law and to the need for more adequate implementation of the human rights of all persons. The efforts of such groups have increased the general awareness of governmental violations of human rights.
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They have also contributed to several "linkages" between and among individuals and groups 63 which are likely to add an important dimension to ongoing efforts at private implementation and sanctioning of international law. 64 In this sense, these groups are on the "front line" of such an effort, stimulated in part by the Helsinki process.
There are, of course, many Helsinki monitoring groups in the West whose activities also contribute to the "legal effects" of the Final Act. 65 There are even groups monitoring the performance of the U.S. Government. 6 6 As suggested by Professor Virginia Leary, these private implementary groups are not only the product of the Helsinki Final Act, but also are legitimized by the portion of principle VII of the act wherein the participating states "confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties." ' 67 Nevertheless, such a right arguably had already existed in more authoritative human rights instruments 68 and was merely supplemented in an important way or "confirmed" by the Helsinki Final Act. In any event, the Helsinki process has certainly furthered transnational efforts to make each human being's right "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas . . . regardless of frontiers" more meaningful.
69
See also Leary, supra note 33, at 394 ("one of the most important contributions" of the Final Act has been the spawning of private monitoring groups).
61. See, e.g, supra notes 33-34; Chalidze, supra note 17, at 431, 434; Coughlin, supra note 14, at 517; Errera, supra note 58, at 410-11, 421-25; Leary, supra note 14, at 122-25; Leary, supra note 33, at 377-83, 387; Paust, supra note 2, at 646-52; Pechota, supra note 17, at 480-84, 486, 488-89 ; Turner, The Artist in the Amphitheatre, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 308, 308-10, 312, 318 (1979) ; Turack, supra note 2, at 112-13; Turack, supra note 14, at 591-92, 597-98, 606-07; 15 Czechoslovak Dissidents Reported Seized in Prague, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1980, at 5, col. 2; Vsiting Brtish Educator Expelled by Czechoslovaks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1980, at 5, col. 2; Czechs Said to Release DissidentJaled 3 Years, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1980, at 7, col. 6. 62. See, e.g Human rights do not fare well, however, under other provisions of the Soviet Constitution as interpreted in practice by Soviet elites. 79 Perhaps the new Treaty on Transboundary Air Pollution that arose out of the Helsinki experience will be more meaningful.
C. Domestic Cases
Within the last six years, there has been little judicial use of the Helsinki Final Act. No known Eastern European cases use the Final Act, perhaps due to the fact that even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has not been publicized and attempts to use it or any other human rights legal instruments in court proceedings have been repressed. 8 ' In contrast, a judicial opinion in Turkey cited the Helsinki Final Act in striking down a law adversely affecting foreign journalists.
8 2
In the United States, although only two federal courts have cited the Final Act in their opinions, the act has been cited by litigants and by the U.S. Government in an amicus brief during judicial proceedings.
8 3 In a New York case addressing prison conditions, a petitioner argued that in the Final Act, as well as in other instruments, the United States had committed itself to fulfill its human rights obligations. 84 The matter was finally settled by the state attorney general, "apparently because prison officials had violated prison rules." 85 A more important development involved the U.S. Government's amicus brief before the Second Circuit in Filar/iga v. There, the Government recognized that customary international law includes the obligation of nation-states "to observe fundamental human rights." ' 8 7 The Government's brief also recognized that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "goes beyond the UN Charter in specifying and defining the fundamental rights to which all individuals are entitled," adding: "The Universal Declaration has been followed by a growing number of UN resolutions clarifying and elaborating on these rights or invoking them in specific Kan. 1980) . Fernandez involved habeas corpus challenges to the detention by the United States of several hundred Cuban refugees in a maximum security prison for more than six months without charges. Human rights and other norms of international law were used by the district court as a basis for its conclusion that federal detention was unconstitutional, and by the circuit court as aids for the interpretation of relevant statutory and constitutional norms. For further exposition, see, e.g., Paust, Human Rights, supra note 3, at 232-36, 242, 244, and Symposium, 4 Hous. J. INr'L L. 1 (1981) .
92. See Paust, Human Rights, supra note 3, at 229, 244 passim. 93. See, e.g., Leary, supra note 14, 149, 154-57 (1976) .
96. See, e.g., Vest, supra note 15, at 53; Nimetz, supra note 15, at 94-95; Fascell, supra note 21, at 353 (also mentioning an extensive human rights meeting between the United States and Romania in 1980). On the utility of the Helsinki process for human rights "discussion and persuasion," see Hansell, 71 PROc. . 207, 209 (1977) ; see also Friendly, 73 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 195 (1979) ; Comment, supra note 14, at 138.
97. Countries mentioned were: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia (which is one of the most open and is labeled as nonaligned).
98. See, e.g., Feldbrugge, supra note 33, at 456, 462, 464; Leary, supra note 14, Nimetz, supra note 15, [92] [93] Paust, supra Certainly there are other policies at stake-policies relating to human dignity, individual freedom, free speech, equitable development and sharing of information, wealth, power, self-determination, public order, national security, and "cultural imperialism"1 02 -but continued oppression is the clear result.
IV PRESENT LEGAL UTILITY OF THE ACT
A. Freedom to "Know and Act"
As mentioned, the Helsinki Final Act, by merely reaffirming the right of individuals to "know and act," has important legal utility in connection with efforts to assure widespread enjoyment of human rights. Most Western writers have recognized another important reaffirmation contained in principle VII-the recognition of "the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for . . . peace, justice and well-being . . . ... As writers tend uniformly to proclaim, such a recognition constitutes a significant admission by each participating state that respect for human rights is an international concern and is not within the exclusive province of any particular state within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter.
1 0 3 In this sense, states and other entities also have a right to "know and act." This is an important reaffirmation, and its utility does not depend upon whether the principles of the Final Act are legally binding. Indeed, the entire Helsinki process has helped to further internationalize human concern about state violations of human rights. It does not matter that the obligations themselves are primarily moral or political; what matters is that there has been an internationalization of such human concern. 0 4 This clearly has occurred.
B. Use as an Interpretive Aid
The fact that the Helsinki Act, whether or not it is a legal document, has contributed to international law by reaffirming human rights and correlative nationstate obligations is generally recognized.' 0 5 Thus, the Final Act can play an important role by furthering and perhaps reshaping patterns of legal expectation concerning human rights. It has also been suggested that the Helsinki Act can play a useful role as an interpretive aid or as evidence of further refined content concerning such human rights matters as transnational speech.' As explained by Professor Tom Buergenthal, "various provisions of the Helsinki Final Act may be viewed as evidence of the practice of states . . . [and] can assist in establishing authoritative interpretations of ambiguous international instruments . . . . 07 Later, he added:
The human rights provisions contained in Basket III. . . are for the most part narrower in scope and more specific. . . [and] whenever the Basket III provisions are more specific than those set out in various obligatory international human rights instruments..., the former may be resorted to by the signatory states to clarify the meaning of the latter, including the intended reach of available defenses, limitations, and escape clauses ....
108
The problem with this nearly unqualified acceptance of the Final Act as an interpretive aid is that despite the suggestions of such a utility by certain textwriters, a more broadly based expectation that the Act is, in toto, an authoritative documentation of human rights content is still lacking. Some provisions undoubtedly mirror human rights law; some are arguably relevant as authoritative interpretive aids. Are other provisions merely representative of a new "political" or "moral" will? Do some provisions lack a basis of support in patterns of generally shared legal expectation? 0 9 There would have to be a better demonstration of actual patterns of acceptance of the Basket III provisions as legally relevant interpretive aids before one could conclude that the Act is useful as an authort'tat/we guide to content. We may be close to such an acceptance, especially as private groups increasingly rely on the Helsinki provisions in making legal claims.
10 Nevertheless, we do not seem to have reached such a stage at this time. It may be argued that the United States' amicus brief in Fi/artiga refutes the last point, but such language may be read restrictively at present (i.e., "provides evidence" might be read "in part provides evidence" of customary law)," 1 especially since some of the Basket III provisions proved relatively contentious during the conference proceedings.' 1 2
Similarly, claims have been made that the Helsinki Final Act estops participating states from denying the legal nature of its provisions.
1 3 But such a claim ultimately begs the same sort of question. It is an ingenious argument. In this case, however, permissible reliance in connection with estoppel theory relates best to a reliance upon foreign state declarations that evidence that state's acceptance or recognition of some standard as a legal standard. 1 14 These claims seek to estop a foreign state's denial that it is legally bound by certain declarations previously made concerning legally relevant standards or, more generally, its legal obligations.
The estoppel claims are not concerned primarily with moral or political obligations as such, although the concept of a "political obligation" raises interesting questions. Presumably, the Helsinki signators are estopped from denying the moral and political nature of the obligations assumed in the Final Act. Although they may not be illusory, 1 5 these obligations rest on a different set of expectations-those regarding the appropriateness of a partial or total noncompliance or the consequences of noncompliance, for example.' For these reasons, it seems more advantageous to stress the legal authoritativeness of the UN Charter human rights obligations and the legally relevant, if not customary, content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These instruments reflect the human right to transnational freedom of speech. With this in mind, one can view the Basket III provisions of the Final Act partly as reflecting legal content and partly as a demonstrated political will "to proceed to the implementation of" 11 7 legal and political goals and obligations. Indeed, many of the provisions are couched in implementary language, 118 thus demonstrating what appears primarily to be a political will to implement. In this sense, the statement contained in Basket III that the participating states make it "their aim to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds,"' 1 9 or that they intend "in particular. . . [t] o contribute to the improvement of access by the public to periodical and non-periodical printed publications," 120 takes nothing away from the human rights obligations of the UN Charter, as authoritatively supplemented by the Universal Declaration.' 2 1 Such statements take nothing away from the legal expectation documented in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that everyone has the right "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."' 122 What is sometimes neglected is an adequate implementation of such a right. The general legal expectation continues that such a right should have a remedy. 123 Helsinki, in this sense, seeks a more adequate remedy. Additionally, the authoritativeness of human rights law does not rest on the consent or lack of consent of any particular state. What is needed in the international community is a generally shared expectation, rather than total consent. 124 Thus, it would not matter that the Soviet Union, as a law violator, did not consent to an international legal norm. Nor would it matter that the Soviet Union misinterpreted the "necessity within democratic limits" test of permissible restrictions of free speech 125 and engaged in conduct that was violative of international law. As suggested by Professor Jochen Frowein, the "escape clauses" are not interpreted in a final way by a particular state. 1 26 Rather, they are only provisionally interpreted with the possibility of community review. 127 117. Basket III, § 1 (Human Contacts), preamble. 118. For example, much of the relevant language of § 2 (Information) reads: "aim to facilitate," "will encourage," "will facilitate," "will take appropriate measures," "will favour." Id § 2.
119. Id. § 2, preamble. 120. Id § 2(a)(ii). Perhaps the most realistic future legal potential of the Helsinki Final Act involves its more broadly based acceptance as an interpretive aid. If its authoritativeness as a guide increases, the Final Act might be utilized to provide an expanded meaning of transnational freedom of speech. Perhaps then, as suggested by Professor Frowein, it will evidence a more expanded or detailed content that cannot be excluded from the meaning of other human rights instruments.
12
Here it is assumed that the Final Act will continue to have important legal effects whether or not it obtains a legal status. The role of the Helsinki process in stimulating private attitudes and behavior will be particularly important. Someday there may exist widespread expectations that the entire Final Act exemplifies either customary nation-state obligations or human rights content, or both. But such a customary status is for the future.'
29
In the meantime, there exists a human right to transnational freedom of speech-a right partly thwarted by certain state elites, but partly furthered by the Helsinki process and a revolution in communications technology that may serve even more effectively than "binding" legal documents to liberate human thought and communication from oppression by state elites. Against those who choose in the future to deny such a human right, the "rocks and stones themselves" may also "start to sing."' 3 0
128. See Frowein, supra note 12, [76] [77] 129. See also Buergentbal, supra note 13, at 6-7; Kiss & Dominick, supra note 12, at 315; Russell, The Hdssnki Declaration, supra note 15, at 248.
130. Hosanna, in jesus Christ Superstar (A. Webber & T, Rice 1970). The full paragraph reads, "Why waste your breath moaning at the crowd? Nothing can be done to stop the shouting. If every tongue was still the noise would still continue. The rocks and stones themselves would start to sing.
... Today the "rocks and stones" can "sing"-when fashioned by human hands into telecommunication satellites and other media instruments.
